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In the last thirty years, sentencing in the federal criminal sys-
tem has undergone significant legislative and judicial change.
From a system of nearly complete judicial discretion, to a system
of rigid guidelines, to a system that lies somewhere in between,
federal sentencing has challenged judges to adapt their procedures
for sentencing and their understanding of their own role in the
process. In today's post-Booker world, sentencing judges face the
new challenge of considering how much discretion is too much.
Must they temper their own preferences when sentencing defen-
dants, or have the Supreme Court's most recent rulings allowed
them the free rein they once enjoyed in the pre-Guidelines world?
This article attempts to address those concerns and suggests that,
while discretion in sentencing is key to fair and just sentences, in
today's climate with intense legislative interest in sentencing,
judges must use that discretion judiciously or else run the risk of
being forced into an era of mandatory minimums and determinate
sentences, which could stifle discretion even more than the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.
Part I of this article undertakes a brief historical overview of
sentencing in the United States, focusing in particular on how the
use-or overuse-of judicial discretion shaped sentencing policy.
Part II discusses the sweeping changes that took place in the last
seven years based on Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 Blakely v. Wash-
ington,2 and United States v. Booker.3 Part III focuses on current
sentencing trends post-Booker, and Part IV sets forth my proposal
for tempered judicial discretion, focusing on striking the right bal-
l. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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ance between the need for judicial discretion and the recognition
of the balance of power between the three branches of the govern-
ment.
I. JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
A. The Growth of Indeterminate Sentencing
The Sentencing Guidelines did not arise as a flight of Congres-
sional fancy. Rather, they developed from a concern, which began
in the early 1970s, that indeterminate judicial sentencing was
leading to unjust results. In the early days of the Nation's history,
sentencing judges and prison systems included punishment as a
goal of imprisonment. However, by the time the 20th Century
began, the focus of most American prison reformers and, soon,
prisons themselves, was rehabilitation. 4 Picking up on this socie-
tal norm, in 1949 the Supreme Court noted that rehabilitation had
replaced punishment and revenge as the primary purpose of im-
prisonment: "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of
criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have
become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."
5
In order to achieve the goals of rehabilitation and reformation,
sentencing judges required a considerable amount of discretion.
Because each criminal was unique and required a unique punish-
ment in order to be rehabilitated, strictly delineated sentences
simply would not do. "In the view of proponents of rehabilitation,
the duration of imprisonment, whatever the crime, 'should not be
for weeks, months or years, but until that end for which alone [an
offender] should be put [in prison] is accomplished; that is, until
reformation has evidently been affected [sic]."'6 If the legislature
mandated particular sentences for particular crimes, a criminal
might be released before he was rehabilitated or spend time in
prison well after his rehabilitation was complete. In order to pre-
vent this, sentences had to be tailored to the particular criminal
then before the court. Therefore, between 1880 and 1911, twenty-
4. Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy,
Practice, and Prospects, in 3 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000 109, 111 (Julie Horney et al. eds.,
2000).
5. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
6. KATIE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting 4 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (Wayne L. Morse et al. eds., 1939)).
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eight states passed indeterminate sentencing laws. 7 By the 1960s,
every state in the nation had some form of indeterminate sentenc-
ing.8
B. The Replacement of Indeterminate Sentencing
Indeterminacy's dominance over the American judicial system,
however, was not to be permanent. As the 1970s dawned, critics
began to point out flaws in the indeterminate sentencing systems
that were in effect in all parts of the country. Critics' objections
were twofold: first, rehabilitation simply had not been effectuated
by indeterminate sentencing, and second, criminals were facing
vastly different sentences for the same crimes. Critics, such as
Robert Martinson in his famous article What Works?,9 debunked
the idea that imprisonment had any rehabilitative effects. "[W]ith
few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidi-
vism."10 Despite continuing efforts to rehabilitate criminals, stud-
ies found that most returned to a life of crime after release. 11
However, the failure of indeterminate sentencing did not end
with its failure to reach its stated goal. Rather, a second, and per-
haps more disturbing, flaw was uncovered. Criminals who had
engaged in substantially similar behavior and had substantially
similar criminal histories faced dramatically different sentences
depending on which court passed judgment. As Judge Marvin
Frankel pointed out, "[t]he result ... is a wild array of sentencing
judgments without any semblance of the consistency demanded by
the ideal of equal justice."12 The federal system, like most state
systems at the time, simply prescribed a range of punishment-
five years to life, for example. However, it gave no indication as to
where within that vast range a particular kind of defendant
should be sentenced, leading to the noticeable disparities in sen-
tences. "The broad statutory ranges might approach a degree of
ordered rationality if there were prescribed any standards for lo-
cating a particular case within any range. But neither our federal
7. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 894 (1990).
8. Id.; see also Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 ('Indeterminate sentences ... have to a large
extent taken the place of old rigidly fixed punishments.").
9. Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974).
10. Id. at 25.
11. Id. at 49.
12. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973).
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law nor that of any state I know contains meaningful criteria for
this purpose."1 3 The concern over disparity was not simply an
academic debate, but rather a problem vocalized by academics,' 4
lawmakers, 15 and judges. 16
By the mid-1970s, the states were responding to such concerns
by enacting sentencing systems that removed at least some discre-
tion from judges. By 1984, fifteen states' criminal codes had un-
dergone significant revisions that resulted in determinate sentenc-
ing. 7 For example, until 1978, the State of Arizona had a primar-
ily indeterminate sentencing system. After a 1977 pilot program
of sentencing guidelines in Maricopa County (where Phoenix is
located), the Arizona legislature passed laws that created a pre-
sumptive sentencing system.' 8 The system created six classes of
felonies and three classes of misdemeanors, with each class having
a maximum and minimum sentence. Under the system, there was
a definite term that was "presumed" to be the appropriate sen-
tence. Deviations from the presumed sentence were then deter-
mined by the classification of the felony and the "dangerous" or
"non-dangerous" nature of the criminal.19 Such a system removed
a significant amount of discretion from the sentencing judge and
made predicting the sentence for a particular criminal more a
matter of computation than crystal-ball gazing.
C. Federal Sentencing Reform
The federal government responded in kind. In 1966, at the urg-
ing of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Congress created the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, bet-
ter known as "the Brown Commission."20 After the Brown Com-
mission's 1971 report indicated that "sentencing disparities were
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING
SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964).
15. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1984).
16. See FRANKEL, supra note 12.
17. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washing-
ton. SHANDRA SHANE-DUBOw ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 282-85 (1985).
18. Id. at 23-24.
19. Id. at 24.
20. See Joseph F. Hall, Note, Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the Sentencing Guide-




large and pervasive,"21 Congress began to investigate ways to
change the federal criminal code. Prior to Congressional revi-
sions, the federal criminal code was created through an ad hoc
process of piling one statute on top of another. 22 The result was a
code that was often difficult to access and sentences that were
nearly impossible to predict.23
In response, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced Senate Bill
2699, which would have created a federal sentencing commission
and reduced the number of statutory minimums then included in
the federal criminal code. 24 That bill failed to get the necessary
support, and in the next several years, a number of other bills
pushing for sentencing reform would fail to proceed past commit-
tee or be rejected once they reached the floor.25 Finally, in 1984,
President Ronald Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act into law. 26 The Act created the Federal Sentencing Com-
mission, a first step toward the creation: of the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines. Following the passage of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act, Congress successfully passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984,27 with the goals of reducing unwarranted dis-
parity in sentences, 28 assuring the certainty and severity of pun-
ishment, and increasing the rationality and transparency of pun-
ishment. 29
D. Federal Sentencing After 1984
Following the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, federal
courts began the difficult task of learning and applying the newly
21. Id. at 1340.
22. See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 45, 88-114 (1998).
23. See Herbert Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 526 (1955) ("As our statutes stand at present, they are
disorganized and often accidental in their coverage, a medley of enactment and of common
law, far more important in their gloss than in their text even in cases where the text is
fairly full, a combination of the old and the new that only history explains.").
24. S. 2699, 94th Cong. (1975).
25. See, e.g., S. 1437, 95th Cong. (1978) (bill introduced by Senators Kennedy and
McClellan calling for the re-codification of criminal laws, restrictions on parole, and the
establishment of sentencing commission that did not make it out of committee); Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1979, S. 1722, 96th Cong. (1980) (similar bill to S. 1437 that was not
enacted); S. 2572, 97th Cong. (1982) (comprehensive criminal code revision that passed the
Senate, but was deleted from a completed bill by the House).
26. S. 1762, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 668, 98th Cong. (1983).
27. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86 & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41-46 (1984).
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(C), 991(b)(2), 3553(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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created Guidelines. As written, the Guidelines create a "base of-
fense level" for each crime delineated in the United States Code.
30
Beginning with that base offense level, an offender's total offense
level is then calculated based on a number of factors, including the
impact on the victim, 31 the nature of the offender, his role in the
offense, and any subsequent conduct on his part.3 2 Such findings
are undertaken by the district court using a preponderance of the
evidence standard.3 3 The sentencing court must then determine
the offender's criminal history.3 4 Based on these determinations,
the sentencing court calculates the offender's total Guidelines
range.35 Upon motion by the offender or the government, the sen-
tencing court may depart from the Guidelines range under certain
carefully delineated circumstances, 36 such as acceptance of re-
sponsibility. 37 The court is also granted the authority to grant
upward or downward departures from the Guidelines based on
other circumstances not taken into consideration in the Guide-
lines.38 However, these kinds of departures may only be applied
in very limited circumstances, in the "exceptional case" when the
Guidelines do not take the circumstances into consideration in any
form. 39
Under the Sentencing Reform Act as it existed until recently,
district courts had virtually no discretion other than to choose a
sentence from within the Guidelines range, which could present a
difference of six to eighty-one months between the Guidelines
minimum and maximum, depending on the Guidelines range.
40
Imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines range was manda-
tory.41 Courts of appeals exercised plenary review over a district
court's calculation of a sentence, 42 giving due regard to the district
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § B1.I(b) (2006) (hereinafter GUIDELINES);
see also generally id. ch. 2 (delineating the base offense level for each violation of the United
States Code).
31. Id. §§ 3A1.1-1.3.
32. Id. §§ 3B1.1-1.5, 3C1.1-1.4, 3E1.1.
33. Id. § 6A1.3 cmt.
34. Id. ch. 4.
35. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5A.
36. See generally id. § 5K.
37. Id. § 5K.1.
38. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B).
39. Id.
40. See Sentencing Table, GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5A.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
42. Id. § 3742(e).
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court's determinations regarding credibility and overturning fac-
tual findings only where there was clear error. 43
The benefits of such a system of limited discretion were clear.
The first, and most obvious, benefit was the reduction in sentenc-
ing disparity. As indicated by the Sentencing Reform Act itself,
the Guidelines aimed "to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct. ' 44 This focus on reducing disparity
arose, in part, from a fear that the continuation of unequal pun-
ishment would result in diminished respect for the law. As the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing
stated, "[w]here equal treatment is not the rule, potential offend-
ers are encouraged to play the odds, believing that they too will be
among the large group that escapes serious sanction." 45 With a
system of Sentencing Guidelines, defendants could predict, with
some certainty, what sort of sentence they would receive for their
crime regardless of the judge that imposed the sentence, thereby
reducing the likelihood of benefitting from gambling with the sys-
tem.
In addition to preventing defendants from gambling with the
system, the more uniform approach created predictability and
fairness. Defendants, regardless of race or financial situation,
faced approximately the same, predictable sentence if they com-
mitted sufficiently similar crimes. While this need to eliminate
unwarranted sentencing disparities was the primary focus of the
Sentencing Reform Act, the system of limited discretion that the
Act created came with other benefits as well. 46 To some degree,
the Sentencing Reform Act reduced irrationality in sentencing. 47
The Guidelines attempt to punish the most serious crimes the
most severely.
However, as the federal judiciary settled into the Guidelines
system, criticism inevitably arose. As an initial matter, critics
claimed that the Guidelines were simply too unwieldy and com-
43. Id.
44. Id. § 3553(a)(6) (2000).
45. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 6 (1976).
46. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the
United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1993).
47. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 397
(2005) ("With varying degrees of success, sentencing guidelines appear to have reduced
unwarranted disparity and brought a degree of rationality to sentencing.").
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plex.48 In addition to arguing that this complexity led to an inabil-
ity to properly understand and apply the Guidelines, critics also
argued that their great complexity led to "unreasonable rigidity"
and was "a primary cause of an increasing institutional imbalance
in both the rulemaking and individual case."
49
Further, critics attacked the Guidelines' tendency to move dis-
cretion away from judges and towards federal prosecutors. Under
the Guidelines system, United States Attorneys and their assis-
tants retained the power not only to decide with what crime a de-
fendant would be charged, but also what kinds of sentencing fac-
tors he or she would choose to prove at sentencing. 50 Therefore,
depending on which federal prosecutor prosecuted a particular
case, a defendant could face a very different sentence, resulting in
the very disparity the Sentencing Reform Act sought to elimi-
nate. 5
1
In addition to these general concerns, the judiciary itself faced
challenges when applying the Guidelines. Congressional involve-
ment in the sentencing process, it was argued, resulted in pun-
ishments that were simply too severe for particular kinds of
criminal conduct. 52 However, because of the rigid nature of the
Guidelines, judges lacked the ability to mold sentences to fit the
seriousness of a particular offense. 53 This problem was exacer-
bated by the limitations on the ways in which a judge could sen-
tence a defendant outside of the Guidelines. Unless the Guide-
lines provided for a departure from a Guidelines sentence, such as
48. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 299, 327-34 (2000) (discussing
criticism of the Guidelines for being too complex).
49. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal
Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 169 (2005).
50. See generally William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENVG REP. 309 (1993) (discussing the numerous decisions fed-
eral prosecutors make when charging a defendant and arguing for a proper sentence).
51. Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 908-09
(2005) (attributing punishment disparities to prosecutorial charging decisions).
52. Molly Treadway Johnson & Scott A. Gilbert, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Re-
sults of the Federal Judicial Center's 1996 Survey, 5-6 (1997), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurvey.pdf/$file/gssurvey.pdf; but see generally
Paul Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of
the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004) (arguing that the Guide-
lines are not too severe).
53. One survey indicated that as many as forty-five percent of Article III judges be-
lieved that the Guidelines were too inflexible. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Surveying Article
III Judges' Perspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 15 FED. SEN'G REP. 215,
215-16 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/judsurv.htm.
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a substantial assistance departure, 54 judges could only depart
from the Guidelines range under extraordinary circumstances.
55
Any such determination was reviewed de novo by an appellate
court. 
56
Despite these real concerns about the Guidelines, they remained
virtually untouched by legal challenges for the first twenty years
of their existence. Constitutional challenges failed, 57 and the
Guidelines remained basically unchanged. 58
II. APPRENDI, BLAKELY, BOOKER, AND THE RETURN OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
However, as the century turned, new jurisprudence emerged
that would change the landscape of federal sentencing forever.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, issued June 26, 2000, reiterated the
phrase penned in Jones v. United States that would find its way
into so many judicial opinions to follow:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,
any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indict-
ment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
59
But what this phrase could mean for federal sentencing did not
become apparent until nearly four years later. In Blakely v.
Washington, the Supreme Court invalidated, on Sixth Amendment
grounds, Washington state's mandatory sentencing guidelines
scheme. 60 The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of Ap-
prendi, the statutory maximum was that set by the guidelines, not
that included in the definition of the crime. 61 Therefore, when a
54. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5K1.1.
55. Id. § 5K2.0.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
57. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (finding that the
Guidelines did not violate the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine).
58. In 2003, Congress did undertake some substantial changes to the Guidelines.
Known as the Feeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act), the 2003 changes attempted to
discourage downward departures. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in
scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
59. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
60. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
61. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.
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judge found facts by a preponderance of the evidence that in-
creased a defendant's sentence beyond that set by the Guidelines,
he violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.62
Not sixth months later, the final hammer stroke fell in United
States v. Booker.63 In order to address whether the Supreme
Court's holding in Blakely would affect the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on two related
cases: United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan.
64
With Booker,65 the Supreme Court put to rest the last of the ques-
tions about the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. As written, the Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights. 66 Under the Guidelines as they existed in
January 2005, if a federal judge made no findings of fact beyond
those made by the jury, he would have been required to impose a
certain sentence that was mandated by the Guidelines. Therefore,
any time he made additional factual findings, such as drug quan-
tity, that a gun had been used in the crime, or that a person had
been injured, the judge made findings beyond those proved to a
jury or admitted by a defendant. Such findings increased the term
to which a defendant could be sentenced. 67 This operation of the
Guidelines violated the exact language cited in Apprendi that "any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
68
In the remedial portion of the opinion, the Supreme Court de-
termined that, rather than have the entire scheme held unconsti-
tutional or graft a jury requirement onto each fact that affected a
Guidelines sentence, Congress would prefer that the unconstitu-
tional portions be excised. 69 Therefore, §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)
were removed from the Guidelines. By excising § 3553(b)(1),
which stated that "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), the court
shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred
62. Id. at 304-05.
63. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
64. Booker, cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 (2004); Fanfan, cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956
(2004).
65. As a matter of references, the two cases are generally referred to by the single
name, Booker.
66. Booker, 543 U.S. at 248.
67. Id. at 333-34.
68. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).
69. Booker, 543 U.S. at 248-49.
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to in subsection (a)(4) [the applicable Guidelines range]," Booker
rendered the Guidelines effectively advisory, taking them outside
the scope of Apprendi.70 The Guidelines would remain otherwise
intact, and sentencing judges would still be required to consider
them. 71  They would simply not be mandatory. 72  Rather, the
Guidelines would serve as just one of the seven factors set forth at
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that district courts should consider when im-
posing a sentence.
However, excision of § 3553(b)(1) alone was not sufficient. In
order to render the Guidelines truly advisory, the provision of the
Guidelines that set forth the standard for appellate review also
had to be excised. Section 3742(e) had previously provided that
courts of appeals were to review a district court's determination of
a sentence de novo, overturning such a sentence if it was imposed
based on improper calculation of the Guidelines or in violation of
law, 73 and § 3742(e) contained "critical cross-references" to §
70. Id. at 259.
71. Id. at 259-60.
72. Id.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The entire provision read:
(e) Consideration.-Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall de-
termine whether the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons
required by section 3553(c);
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on
a factor that-
(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or
(ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b); or
(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applica-
ble guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be considered in
imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the
reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the
district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of
fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, except with re-
spect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due defer-
ence to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With re-
spect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals
shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts.
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3553(b)(1). 74 Therefore, it, too, was removed. While it appeared
that the excision of § 3742(e) left the courts of appeals with no
standard of review, Booker held that there was an implicit stan-
dard of review contained in the newly revised Guidelines: 75
We infer appropriate review standards from related statutory
language, the structure of the statute, and the "sound admini-
stration of justice." Pierce [v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,] 559-
560, [(1988)]. And in this instance those factors, in addition
to the past two decades of appellate practice in cases involv-
ing departures, imply a practical standard of review already
familiar to appellate courts: review for "unreasonable[ness]."
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.).
76
From Booker onward, courts of appeals were no longer to review
federal sentences de novo, but for reasonableness. While that may
have appeared to be a resolution of the issue, rendering the Guide-
lines advisory was simply the first step in a judicial restructuring
of sentencing and sentencing review. Beginning on January 17,
2005, district courts and courts of appeals began the challenging
process of discerning how to sentence in an age of newfound dis-
cretion.
III. FEDERAL SENTENCING IN THE POST-BOOKER WORLD: THE
CURRENT USE OF DISCRETION
The process of discerning how to sentence offenders has pro-
gressed rapidly in the nearly three years since Booker was de-
cided. Both district courts and courts of appeals have made deci-
sions about procedures to be used and the kinds of considerations
that ought to factor into their sentencing decisions. A review of
current sentencing procedures highlights the ongoing attempts to
decide how much discretion ought to be employed.
A. A Statistical Review of Sentences
In the post-Booker arena, defendants, on the whole, are facing
similar sentences to those they faced before Booker. According to
the most recent information from the United States Sentencing
Commission, approximately sixty-one percent of defendants are
74. Booker, 543 U.S at 260.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 260-61.
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sentenced within the advisory Guidelines range. 77 This number is
about a four-percent change from the sixty-five percent of sen-
tences that were reported within the Guidelines range for 2002,
before Booker was decided. 78 While the change is noticeable, it
does not reflect the fear of some post-Booker commentators that
judges, now invested with a new kind of discretion, would ignore
the Guidelines and sentence defendants however they saw fit.
Rather, as before Booker, most defendants find themselves sen-
tenced within the Guidelines range.
In addition, while there has been a slight increase in the num-
ber of sentences above the Guidelines, 79 the largest change ap-
pears to be in downward departures. According to one 2005 study,
approximately 8.6 percent of below-Guidelines sentences could be
attributed to Booker.80 As was the case pre-Booker, a majority of
below-Guidelines sentences are sponsored by the Government.
81
However, some district courts are imposing their own below-
Guidelines sentences based on their newfound discretion.8 2 But
precisely how are district courts going about determining such
sentences?
B. District Court Procedures for Outside-of- Guidelines Sentences
How a district court should go about granting an outside-of-
Guidelines sentence is a topic that has merited much discussion in
the courts of appeals. In order to discuss the division between the
courts of appeals, I will adopt the nomenclature of "departures"
and "variances." Under this description of things, "departures"
are those additions or reductions that occur within the Guidelines
system but that take a sentence outside of the Guidelines range.
These kinds of departures include delineated departures, such as
acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance, 83 and non-
delineated departures considered at Guidelines section 5K2.0.84
77. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT [hereinaf-
ter QUARTERLY REPORT] 1 tbl. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/QuarterReport-lQrt-07.pdf.
78. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2002, tbl.8, available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2002.htm.
79. According to a recent article, the change in above-the-Guidelines sentences has
been approximately one percent. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion
in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 731 (2005).
80. Id.
81. QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 77, at 1 tbl.1.
82. Klein, supra note 79, at 726-30.
83. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5K1.I.
84. Id. § 5K2.0.
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Variances, however, are changes in sentences based, not on the
Guidelines themselves, but on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). For example, they may be based on an offender charac-
teristic that is not considered in the Guidelines but that can be
considered under § 3553(a)(1).
Depending on which court of appeals sits over the sentencing
court, defendants may face very different procedures and review if
they are granted a departure rather than a variance. As indi-
cated by Congress, Guidelines departures should be rare. "Under
[the] guideline sentencing system, the judge should be able to sen-
tence outside the guideline range in unusual circumstances, but
should . .. give reasons for such a sentence."85  Such departures
must be fully justified, and appellate courts will review them de
novo, as they would any Guidelines calculation.8 6 In addition, be-
fore a district court can make such a departure, it must notify the
defendant of the possible grounds for departure pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h).
However, if the defendant's sentence is changed by a variance,
the district court need not have an extraordinary reason. Rather,
such sentences do not require the same justification as departures
and are subject only to reasonableness review by the courts of ap-
peals.8 7 In addition, depending on which circuit a court is in, a
defendant may not receive notice of the grounds for such a below-
Guidelines or above-Guidelines variance.88 The lack of a notice
requirement and the fact that a variance is often more easily justi-
fied than a departure have led some courts to indicate that Guide-
lines departures are "obsolete."8 9
85. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH
CONG., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW REVISION: HEARINGS ON H.R. 1647, H.R. 4492, H.R. 4711,
H.R. 5679, AND H.R. 5703, at 8 (Comm. Print 1983).
86. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 5K2.0 (stating that departures are to be granted only
in rare circumstances); see also United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (stating that court of appeals will continue to exercise plenary review over a district
court's application of the Guidelines); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.
2006) (stating district courts must still rule on departures as they would have under the
pre-Booker regime).
87. United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2006).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 477 F.3d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that
notice under 32(h) is not required for variances based on § 3553(a) factors); United States v.
Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Walker, 447 F.3d at 1007 (same);
but see United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that even
variances under § 3553(a) require notice under 32(h)); United States v. Evans-Martinez,
448 F.3d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Dozier, 444 F.3d 1215, 1218
(10th Cir. 2006) (same).
89. E.g., Walker, 447 F.3d at 1006.
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C. Reviewing Discretionary Sentences at the Appellate Level
Like district courts, appellate courts have adopted different ap-
proaches to reviewing sentences. While all agree that a district
court must first properly calculate a Guidelines sentence and then
impose a reasonable sentence, they do not always agree on how to
determine whether a sentence is reasonable. The two primary
grounds for disagreement, until recently at least, were the pre-
sumption of reasonableness and the relationship between the de-
gree of variance and the strength of the district court's reasons. I
will address each briefly.
In the wake of Booker, appellate courts have struggled to find a
way to articulate what "reasonableness review" actually is, and to
create a process by which appellate courts may review sentences
for reasonableness. In response, a number of circuits adopted the
rule that a within-Guidelines sentence is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness. 90  Other circuits chose not to
adopt such a presumption. 91 The disagreement centered around
whether adopting such a presumption would make the Guidelines
functionally mandatory and, therefore, violate Booker. The Su-
preme Court answered that question in the negative in Rita v.
United States, holding that a court of appeals may-but is not re-
quired to-use a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing
in-Guidelines sentences. 92 It stated that such presumptions are
not binding, nor do they "reflect strong judicial deference of the
kind that leads appeals courts to grant greater fact-finding leeway
to an expert agency than to a district judge."93 Instead, the pre-
sumption merely allows for the recognition that when a district
judge applies an in-Guidelines sentence, both he and the Sentenc-
ing Commission have reached the same conclusion. "That double
determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sen-
tence is a reasonable one."94 Because such a presumption applies
90. E.g., United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Caw-
thorn, 429 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th
Cir. 2005).
91. United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Fer-
nandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518
(1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006).
92. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-63 (2007).




only to appellate review, 95 it does not allow district courts simply
to impose a Guidelines sentence without any further considera-
tion. District courts must still consider the § 3553(a) factors and
make a reasoned, discretionary decision about the appropriate
sentence.
The Supreme Court's decision in Rita clearly reflects a respect
for the Guidelines and the Sentencing Commission. But, at the
same time, it recognizes that district courts have, and ought to
use, discretion when making individual sentencing determina-
tions.
The Supreme Court took up the second question of the deference
to be accorded to the reasons given by the district courts in justify-
ing a deviation from the Guidelines when they decided Gall v.
United States.96 This question went right to the core of reason-
ableness review, asking, as in Rita, what role the Guidelines are
to play in determining whether a sentence is reasonable. The
question was, if a district court deviates substantially, must the
court articulate extraordinary circumstances? Or does such a re-
quirement violate Booker? Courts of appeals were divided. 97 But
the Supreme Court in Gall, reconfirming that the extent of the
difference between a particular sentence and the recommended
Guidelines range is relevant, held that courts of appeals must re-
view all sentences-whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range-under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. 98 The Court went on to clarify that the appel-
late courts must first ensure that the district court made no sig-
nificant procedural errors and then consider the sentence's sub-
stantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard,
giving due deference to the district court's decision that the §
3553(a) factors justify the variance. 99
95. Id. at 2465.
96. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
an extraordinary deviation from the Guidelines must be justified by extraordinary circum-
stances); but see United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating
that Guidelines cannot be given presumptive weight or be presumed presumptively cor-
rect).




IV. GUIDED DISCRETION: A PROPOSAL FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY
A review of history and a survey of current federal sentencing
practice leave us asking, now what? There exist a Congress with a
substantial interest in ensuring that defendants are sentenced a
certain way and a judiciary that has been reinvested with much of
its historical discretion. The task that now faces that judiciary is
to use its discretion in such a way as to respect congressional
wishes, but not so much that it loses its ability to make case-by-
case determinations. What I propose below is a type of guided
discretion wherein federal judges will respect Congress' role in the
sentencing process while using their discretion to sentence specific
defendants based on defendants' personal characteristics and the
circumstances of their offenses. However, before I address my
proposal specifically, it is worthwhile to revisit the importance of
the two interests at stake here: discretion and congressional guid-
ance.
A. The Importance of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing
As history reveals, until the late 1900s, judicial discretion had
been a key ingredient in sentencing, and for good reason. In any
criminal justice system, discretion recognizes that individualized
cases require individualized responses. For that reason, prosecu-
tors retain discretion to mold general statutes to the needs of the
real cases that they see, and judges historically were given the
discretion to mold general criminal penalties to fit the real cases
that came before them.100 In sentencing, in particular, a judge re-
quires discretion for two reasons: first, punishment is about more
than simply retribution, and, second, offenders are people. I will
address each of these in turn.
As the Sentencing Reform Act itself recognizes, punishment is
about more than simply retribution. It also serves to deter both
the individual and other future offenders, to protect the public,
and to rehabilitate the offender. 101 These goals will not always
100. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 145 (1998).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005), which requires a sentencing
judge to consider:
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
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apply to each offender in the same way. For example, let us con-
sider two offenders being sentenced for the same crime: possession
with intent to distribute cocaine. 102 One offender is selling cocaine
in order to finance his own drug habit. The other is simply selling
cocaine because it is easier money than working at the factory
down the street. As between these two offenders, if treating the
first offender's drug addiction is likely to prevent him from com-
mitting future crimes, rehabilitation will be a more important goal
of punishment for that first offender than the second. Perhaps the
second offender has been in and out of prison for years, indicating
that protecting society and retribution are the primary purposes
of punishing that second offender. With an appropriate amount of
discretion, a sentencing judge could tailor each offender's sentence
in such a way as to recognize these varied goals and their applica-
tion to the offenders. With no discretion, judges are prevented
from looking at an offender's individual characteristics and using
those characteristics to apply punishment for an appropriate pur-
pose. 10
3
In addition to allowing judges to consider the purposes of sen-
tencing, some measure of discretion recognizes that offenders are
people. As Professor Ogletree points out, "it is a person who
stands before the bar to accept the punishment imposed by the
court." 10 4 Without discretion, it is only too easy for the sentencer
to simply apply a formula to the crime, rather than to the per-
son.105 Discretion allows for the consideration of the personal
characteristics of an offender-age, upbringing, health-and not
simply the characteristics of the crime-amount of loss, role in the
offense, etc. What this does is return a human element to the ex-
ercise of punishing.
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
Id. manner[.]
102. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), 846 (2000).
103. Another example is provided by Prof. Charles Ogletree, Jr.: "An obvious example is
the age of the offender. Because youths are less mature and responsible than adults, and
hence less culpable for criminal conduct, retribution is a less defensible punishment objec-
tive than is rehabilitation with regard to youthful offenders." Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The
Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1938, 1958 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
104. Id. at 1953.
105. See id. at 1954 ('Thus, if one ignores every personal characteristic of the offender,
other than those that appear to be aggravating factors of the crime, it is likely to lead to
gross miscarriages of justice in individual cases.").
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While discretion plays an important part in any criminal justice
system, it has a very particular and important role in the current
federal Guidelines system. The Guidelines begin with the "heart-
land" case-in other words, they start with the most typical case
of each kind of crime they define. For example, Guidelines section
2J1.3 sets the base offense level for perjury at 14.106 From that
heartland case of perjury, a judge must increase the base offense
level by eight if the perjury involved causing or threatening to
cause physical injury or property damage in order to suborn per-
jury. 107 If the perjury resulted in substantial interference with the
administration of justice, the judge is to increase the base offense
level by three levels.1
08
However, not all perjury offenses are the same. Therefore, as
commentators have suggested, while a base offense level of 14
may be the just punishment for most cases-those close to the
heartland-it will not be a just punishment for cases that fall far
outside the heartland (both more and less morally reprehensible
offenses). As Stith and Cabranes say in their book, Fear of Judg-
ing, "the problem (again) is that if applying these distinguishing
[sentencing] factors (and the relative weights assigned to them)
yields the right sentence for one defendant, it will fail to yield the
right sentence for any defendant who differs from the first in rele-
vant ways not factored into the Guidelines." 10 9 The further out-
side the heartland case an offense is, the less likely that the
Guidelines sentence will be just. Judicial discretion, however, can
account for these differences. In fact, it is important for judges to
retain discretion to consider offenses outside the heartland.
In addition to accounting for offenses outside the heartland of-
fense contemplated by the Guidelines, discretion is also important
in the federal Guidelines scheme to account for offender character-
istics that the Guidelines do not consider. When charging the
Sentencing Commission, Congress instructed that it take account,
to the extent they were relevant, of the following factors: age, edu-
cation, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical
condition (including drug dependence), previous employment re-
cord, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the
offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon criminal
106. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 2J1.3.
107. Id. § 2J1.3(b)(1).
108. Id. § 2J1.3(b)(2).
109. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 124.
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activity for a livelihood.110 Of these suggested offender character-
istics, the only ones that are taken into consideration in the
Guidelines are criminal history, a defendant's reliance on criminal
activity for his livelihood, and his acceptance of responsibility."'
Allowing judges to retain some measure of discretion permits con-
sideration of the factors the Sentencing Commission chose not to
include in its Guidelines.
B. The Need for Balance
However, discretion needs to be exercised within set boundaries.
This need for guided discretion is justified by a number of reasons:
first, failure to balance discretion with guidance results in dispar-
ity; second, unfettered judicial discretion ignores that both the
legislative and executive branches-elected representatives of the
people-maintain a substantial interest in criminal sentences;
and, third, failure to limit discretion may result in serious legisla-
tive backlash. I will address each of these concerns in turn.
1. The Need to Reduce Disparity
As Judge Marvin Frankel indicated in his influential book,
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, allowing judges unfet-
tered discretion results in disparity. Speaking of the sentencing
practices of the 1970s, which left determining a sentence up to a
judge, Judge Frankel described the difficulties of discretion with
no guidance:
Our practice in this country, of which I have complained at
length, is to leave that ultimate question [of how long or se-
vere a sentence should be] to the wide, largely unguided, un-
standardized, usually unreviewable judgment of a single offi-
cial, the trial judge. This means, naturally, that intermediate
questions as to factors tending to mitigate or to aggravate are
also for that individual's exclusive judgment. We allow him
not merely to "weigh" the various elements that go into a sen-
tence. Prior to that, we leave to his unfettered (and usually
110. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1)-(10) (Supp. V 2005).
111. Ogletree, supra note 103, at 1953; see also STITH AND CABRANES, supra note 6, at
122 ("[The Guidelines] calculus adopts a narrow conception of the offender characteristics
that are relevant to sentencing.").
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unspoken) preferences the determination as to what factors
ought to be considered at all, and in what direction. 1
12
The result, as indicated by both history and statistical analysis,
is disparity in sentences-the very disparity that the Guidelines
attempted to address.
2. Legislative and Executive Interest in Sentencing
While disparity in sentences may be sufficient by itself to sup-
port the need for guided discretion, it remains only one of many
reasons that discretion ought to be guided. A system of guided
discretion ensures that the legislative and executive branches can
share a role in sentencing. This is beneficial for two reasons.
First, it allows elected individuals-who represent the interests of
the general public-to offer their input on sentencing. Second, it
puts the bulk of sentencing policy in the hands of the branch best
equipped to deal with sentencing at a global level.
As evidenced by any number of legislative sentencing re-
forms, 113 Congress has a distinct interest in how and to what ex-
tent offenders are sentenced. This is so not merely because sup-
porting legislative sentencing initiatives is a smart political
move. 114 Rather, Congress is composed of elected individuals who
represent a public that is interested in tougher criminal sanc-
tions. 115 While the public may not always have the most educated
ideas on the proper way to deal with crime, 116 elected representa-
tives have a duty to respond to the needs of their constituents.
For this reason alone, Congress has a duty to consider and an in-
terest in how federal offenders are sentenced.
However, the need to respond to constituents is not the only
reason Congress ought to play a role in federal sentencing. Ques-
tions of the proper apportionment of punishment are primarily
112. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 112.
113. See, e.g., The PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
114. See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O'Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Po-
litical Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973,
1975 (2006) (stating that supporting tougher sentencing laws results in public support and
the support of key interest groups).
115. See Sarah Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psycho-
logical and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 25 n.8 (1997) (detailing a number of surveys which indi-
cated that constituents believed legislatures needed to be tougher on crime).
116. See id. at 23-24.
Vol. 46
Striking a Balance
legislative questions.1 7 "Whatever our individual preferences
may be, it is for the legislature in our system to decide and pre-
scribe the legitimate bases for criminal sanctions.""' 8 While this
has been historically true, 119 more than history supports the
proposition that determining punishment on the grand scale is
basically a legislative objective. The legislature, as elected repre-
sentatives, is best situated to make broad value judgments and
choose between competing social concerns when determining the
kinds and lengths of sentences that ought to be applied to particu-
lar kinds of crimes and offenders. 120 Individual sentencing judges
facing individual defendants are poorly suited to such a task.
Therefore, allowing full judicial discretion would put policy deci-
sions, which are best made by the legislature, into the wrong
hands. By allowing Congress and the Sentencing Commission to
guide judicial discretion, policy choices are made by Congress and
then implemented on an individual basis by sentencing judges.
Such a system recognizes the horizontal division of power between
Congress, prosecutor, jury, and judge. 121
3. Legislative Backlash
A final, and eminently practical, reason that judges should em-
brace a system of guided discretion is the simple wish to retain
any discretion at all. An overuse of judicial discretion could result
in individualized, circuit-by-circuit sentencing policy. 122 Such var-
ied sentencing policy would be in direct contravention of the uni-
formity Congress sought to enforce through the enactment of the
Guidelines. Further, an overuse of judicial discretion could result
in sentences for offenders that fall significantly below or above the
sentences that Congress and the Sentencing Commission find are
appropriate for offenders committing certain kinds of crimes.
117. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
118. FRANKEL, supra note 12, at 107; see also Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas,
Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 41 (2006) ('Clegislatures and sen-
tencing commissions define crimes and punishments ex ante .... 1).
119. See Gore, 357 U.S. at 393.
120. Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the
Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1134 (2005).
121. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 118, at 41 (discussing the importance of balancing
power in sentencing decisions between legislature, prosecutor, jury, and judge).
122. Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395, 419-20 (2005).
Fall 2007
Duquesne Law Review
Such sentences may, as Professor Green suggests, "serve as the
political tinder that sparks new legislative reform."
123
As indicated by previous legislative enactments, such as the
PROTECT Act, 124 Congress is not hesitant to react legislatively to
either administrative or judicial sentencing decisions that it finds
unacceptable. 125 What form such reform would take in response
to an overuse of judicial discretion is unclear. It may come in the
form of more mandatory minimums or a complete system of man-
datory sentences. Regardless of its form, most commentators
agree that if the judiciary takes its newfound discretion too far,
Congress will act to limit that discretion. 126 Therefore, discretion
that is appropriately guided by policy statements issued by Con-
gress and the Sentencing Commission is more likely to result in a
judiciary that retains its discretion, rather than one that is con-
strained by Congressionally imposed mandatory sentences.
C. So What Do Judges Do Now?
We've explored the importance of retaining both discretion and
some method of congressional involvement in sentencing. The
question that remains is this: what is the best way for the judici-
ary to go about sentencing so that it respects both the need for
discretion and the need for congressional involvement? That ques-
tion presents itself in different ways to judges at the district court
level and those at the appellate level. However, judges at both
levels must react to the Booker line of cases in such a way as to
maintain that balance. The remainder of this article addresses
ways to strike a compromise.
1. Balance at the District Court Level
The federal district courts face the first hurdle in sentencing:
how to choose an appropriate sentence that looks to the individual
defendant and still respects congressional involvement. My sug-
123. Id. at 422.
124. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42
U.S.C.).
125. See id. § 104 ("Notwithstanding any provision of law regarding the amendment of
Sentencing Guidelines, the United States Sentencing Commission is directed to amend the
Sentencing Guidelines [to increase penalties for child kidnapping offenses].") (emphasis
added).
126. See Norman C. Bay, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 549, 569-70 (2006); Daniel E. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire:
The Dangers of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J.
CORP. L. 619, 620 (2007).
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gestion to district courts is simple: do what Congress and the Su-
preme Court have instructed. Use the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) instructs district courts to con-
sider the following factors when imposing a sentence:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the of-
fense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defen-
dant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vo-
cational training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the ap-
plicable category of defendant as set forth in the guide-
lines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to sec-
tion 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to
any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Con-
gress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in ef-
fect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised re-
lease, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3)
of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any
amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements
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by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement-
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to sec-
tion 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any
amendments made to such policy statement by act of Con-
gress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to
be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on
the date the defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the of-
fense. 12
7
Serious consideration of each of these factors affords a district
court adequate opportunity both to assess the individual needs of
the case presented to it and to reflect upon congressional man-
dates and policy statements.
a. Factors One, Two, and Three: The Use of Judicial
Discretion
Factors one, two, and three offer district courts an opportunity
to make truly individualized sentencing determinations, and dis-
trict courts ought to take advantage of that opportunity. Factor
one instructs district courts to consider the "nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant."'128 Under this sentencing factor, district courts may
consider all of the relevant offender and offense characteristics not
considered by the Guidelines. As indicated above, 129 the Guide-
lines only consider a defendant's criminal history, his reliance on
criminal activity for his livelihood, and his acceptance of responsi-
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
128. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
129. See supra notes 34-37, 110-11, and accompanying text.
Vol. 46
Striking a Balance
bility.130 However, other offender characteristics may play an im-
portant role in determining an appropriate sentence, including
age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition,
physical condition, employment, and family and community
ties.131 Factor one's broad language of "characteristics of the de-
fendant" allows for consideration of these characteristics in rele-
vant cases.
Factor two addresses the need for a sentencing judge to consider
the various purposes of sentencing and their application to each
offender. 132 Section 3553(a)(2) asks district courts to consider
various purposes when sentencing a defendant: retribution, 133 de-
terrence, 134 protection, 3 5 and rehabilitation. 13 6 This allows a dis-
trict court to take consideration of which purposes of sentencing
are most applicable to a given defendant. Take the previous ex-
ample of the two defendants being sentenced for possession with
intent to distribute. 37 Under factor two, a judge may consider
that the defendant who distributes narcotics to pay for his own
addiction may be better served by a sentence that focuses on
treatment and rehabilitation than a defendant who sells simply
for the money. Factor three furthers this exercise of discretion by
requiring judges to consider what kinds of sentences-prison,
fines, home detention, to name a few-are available for each
crime. 138 In short, the first three factors listed in section 3553(a)
require a district court to carefully consider the circumstances of
each crime, the characteristics of individual offenders, and the
application of each purpose of sentencing to the individual. This
provides precisely the kind of discretion necessary for judges to
respond to the individual cases that are presented to them.
130. Ogletree, supra note 103, at 1953.
131. 28 U.S.C. §§ 944(d)(1)-(10) (2000).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
133. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2000) (considering the need for the sentence "to reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense").
134. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
135. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
136. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (considering the need for the sentence "to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner').
137. See supra Section IV.A.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (2000).
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b. Factors Four, Five, and Six: Balancing Congres-
sional Interest
However, a sentencing judge may not stop at factor three. The
next three factors provide the vehicle by which a judge should con-
sider congressional interest and intent in sentencing. Before ad-
dressing factors four and five, which require more in-depth discus-
sion, a short note is in order regarding sentencing factor six, 139
which requires district courts to consider the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities. As both Congress and the Sentenc-
ing Commission had this goal as a primary objective in passing
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and promulgating the Guide-
lines, serious consideration of this factor requires district courts to
consider that the Guidelines represent the best attempt of an ex-
perienced group of individuals to reduce sentencing disparity.
Therefore, consideration of factor six requires contemplating the
Guidelines and, likely more often than not, imposing a sentence
that falls within the range suggested therein. As to factors four
and five, because much of the controversy in the sentencing arena
has focused on the application of these two factors, each will be
considered in turn.
,18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5): Pertinent Policy Statements
As important as the advisory Guidelines range are any perti-
nent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission or
Congress-factor five, considered at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). The
Sentencing Commission followed most Guidelines provisions with
commentary that, in addition to suggesting circumstances that
may warrant a departure, provide the judgment or reason under-
lying the enactment of that particular Guideline. 140 That com-
mentary, as is the case with sections of the Guidelines Manual
actually entitled "Policy Statement," serves to guide a court when
making its sentencing decision. 141 For example, the commentary
to Guidelines section 2M5.3, Providing Material Support to Desig-
nated Terrorist Organizations, suggests that penalties may need
to be increased during a time of war,142 indicating the Sentencing
Commission's belief that such offenses during wartime are more
139. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
140. GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 1B1.7.
141. Id.
142. Id. § 2M5.3 cmt. n.2(B).
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serious than those that occur during a time of peace. Such policy
statements clearly reflect Congress' and the Sentencing Commis-
sion's judgments on the type and length of sentences for particular
types of offenses. These kinds of comments are important indica-
tors that sentencing judges ought to seriously consider when im-
posing a sentence. And it is at this factor that sentencing courts
face the strongest likelihood of overstepping the bounds of appro-
priate guided discretion.
I believe there are two different ways a sentencing court can go
wrong at factor five. First, the court may simply overlook or dis-
regard a policy statement. For example, in a recent case to come
out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
United States v. Tomko, 143 the Third Circuit indicated that the
district court's failure to consider pertinent policy statements for
tax evasion formed part of the circuit court's basis for finding the
ultimate sentence imposed unreasonable. 144 Because the Guide-
lines encouraged imprisonment for tax evaders, the district court's
failure to consider such a policy statement added to the unreason-
ableness of its ultimate term of probation. 145 While it is true that
a district court's failure to look to policy statements may not al-
ways result in an unreasonable sentence, the Third Circuit's re-
flection on the district court's failure to consider such statements
is a good one. A district court does not act in isolation when sen-
tencing a defendant. Rather, it is one of several actors that have a
role and an interest in sentencing a defendant. 146 When a sen-
tencing court fails, by oversight, to consider a policy statement
from a key actor in the sentencing process, it acts without full in-
formation. And when it purposely ignores such a policy state-
ment, it goes beyond its role as judge and becomes a policy maker
itself.
This leads me to the more serious of the two ways in which a
sentencing court can go wrong at factor five: it can expressly reject
policy statements. By so doing, a sentencing court not only fails to
recognize that it is but one of several actors in the sentencing
143. 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007).
144. Id. at 161-64.
145. Id. See also United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352 (8th Cir. 2006). In Ture, like
Tomko, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the District Court's failure to consider the Guide-
line's recommendation of prison time added to the ultimate unreasonableness of the defen-
dant's sentence of probation.
146. Berman & Bibas, supra note 118, at 41 ("In other words, the state cannot impose
punishment without the concurrence of numerous actors, and the system necessarily ac-
commodates the wisdom of each.").
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process, but it invites a congressional response that would remove
all discretion.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4): the Advisory Guidelines Sentence
The factor that has generated perhaps the most controversy in
its application since Booker is section 3553(a)(4)(i), which instructs
a district court to consider "the applicable category of offense com-
mitted by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines ... issued by the Sentencing Commission.... ,,147 This
factor remains in place following Booker, but courts are left won-
dering what role the advisory Guidelines calculation ought to play.
I will consider more fully the role the Guidelines play in appellate
review as elucidated by Rita v. United States and Gall v. United
States in the below section on appellate review. 148 However, re-
gardless of Rita's and Gall's effects on appellate review, district
courts must determine what role the Guidelines ought to play in
their sentencing determinations.
As a starting point, district courts must recognize that the advi-
sory Guidelines range for each offense reflects the learned opinion
of a commission of sentencing experts. Each advisory Guidelines
range is the result of a process of careful deliberation by the Sen-
tencing Commission, a process that takes into consideration the
goals of sentencing set forth by Congress, pertinent policy state-
ments, and years of federal sentencing practice. 149 Such consider-
able effort and careful study of sentencing is likely to result in
sentences that, at least on a general level, reflect the seriousness
of offenses and the appropriate sentence for any heartland of-
fense. 150 To completely disregard such educated advice would
clearly be an act of the most inappropriate of judicial activism.
For this reason, every court of appeals to have considered the
question has required that district courts properly calculate a de-
fendant's advisory Guidelines range as part of a proper sentencing
determination.15' In fact, that calculation is the first step in the
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005).
148. See infra Section IV.C.2.
149. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2464 (2007).
150. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
151. United States v. Hildreth, 485 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Trupin, 475 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.
2006); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Evans-
Maritnez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d
514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir. 2006);
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sentencing process. 152  In properly calculating the Guidelines
range, district courts recognize that legislative and administrative
bodies retain an interest, not just in sentencing policy, but in the
individual sentences doled out to offenders. This recognition rein-
forces the varied roles of legislators and judges in the sentencing
arena. The Supreme Court further clarified this requirement in
Gall, stating that "[a]s a matter of administration and to secure
nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting
point and the initial benchmark."
153
However, properly calculating the range is insufficient. If a dis-
trict court were to properly calculate a range and then disregard
that range without adequate explanation, it would fail to properly
consider the role of Congress and the Sentencing Commission in
the sentencing process. Therefore, while the advisory Guidelines
range cannot be the sole, determinative factor in a defendant's sen-
tence,15 4 it ought to retain a special level of importance in the sen-
tencing process. 155
But the Supreme Court in Gall made it clear that the Guide-
lines are only one of the § 3553(a) factors to be considered when it
stated:
The Guidelines are not the only consideration, however. Ac-
cordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue
for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district
judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to de-
termine whether they support the sentence requested by a
party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines
range is reasonable. He must make an individualized as-
sessment based on the facts presented. If he decides that an
outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Munoz, 430
F.3d 1357, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hagan, 412 F.3d 887, 893 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares, 402
F.3d 511, 518-19 (5th Cir. 2005).
152. See United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 608 (3d Cir. 2007).
153. 128 S. Ct. at 596.
154. See Hon. Nancy Gertner, Judge, D. Mass., The Phillip D. Reed Lecture Series Panel
Discussion: Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory" Guidelines: Observations by District
Judges (October 2006), in 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (2006) (detailing how Booker prohibits
district courts from using the Guidelines as the determinative factor in sentencing).
155. See Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518 ("At the same time, the guidelines cannot be
called just 'another factor' in the statutory list, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000), because they are
the only integration of the multiple factors and, with important exceptions, their calcula-
tions were based upon the actual sentences of many judges .... ').
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the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.
We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be
supported by a more significant justification than a minor
one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, he must ade-
quately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sen-
tencing. 156
In short, at the district court level, sentencing judges must care-
fully balance their role as arbitrators of individual cases against
the roles that Congress, the executive branch (in the shape of a
prosecutor), and the Sentencing Commission play. While discre-
tion ought to be exercised, particularly when considering sentenc-
ing factors one through three, sentencing courts must give due
regard to the experience and judgment of Congress and the Sen-
tencing Commission. They may do so through serious considera-
tion of factors four, five, and six. 157 In short, actual consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors, as required by the United States Code, the
United States Supreme Court, and every court of appeals, will re-
sult, in nearly all cases, in a sentencing process that properly bal-
ances the need for judicial discretion with the need to consider
policies established by Congress and the Sentencing Commission.
2. At the Appellate Level
This need to strike an appropriate balance is not something that
must be considered only at the district court level. Appellate
courts, too, must determine the appropriate level of discretion.
Booker mandated that appellate courts review district court sen-
tences for "unreasonableness."' 158 However, the contours of "rea-
sonableness review" were not clear until the Supreme Court clari-
fied them in Gall.
The Supreme Court took a first step toward defining reason-
ableness in Rita,159 and in so doing recognized the important bal-
ance that must be struck between judicial discretion and congres-
sional guidance. The presumption of reasonableness that Rita
156. 128 S. Ct. at 596-97 (internal citations omitted).
157. While factor seven-the need to provide restitution to the victim, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(7)-also serves a role in balancing discretion and congressional intent, it is not a
factor I take up in great detail here.
158. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61 (2005).
159. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
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allows fits well within the model of guided discretion I have sug-
gested. The Supreme Court recognized that a presumption of rea-
sonableness reflects the nearly Herculean effort by the Sentencing
Commission to create a sentencing system that properly weighs
uniformity, proportionality, and numerous other sentencing
goals. 160 But it does so in such a way as to retain judicial discre-
tion:
Nor does the presumption reflect strong judicial deference of
the kind that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding
leeway to an expert agency than to a district judge. Rather,
the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals
court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review,
both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission
will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sen-
tence in the particular case. 161
This recognizes that both sentencing judges and the Sentencing
Commission share a role in sentencing. "[B]oth the sentencing
judge and the Commission carry[] out the same basic § 3553(a)
objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale."'
162
The Supreme Court further cemented the reasonableness juris-
prudence in Gall. 163 It outlined a two-part approach: the first pro-
cedural and the second substantive. The procedural prong focuses
on the court of appeals' review to ensure a proper Guidelines
range calculation, the recognition that Booker made the Guide-
lines advisory, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, not clearly
erroneous factual findings, and an adequate explanation of the
ultimate sentence imposed. The substantive prong then involves
the review of the reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse-
of-discretion standard. Here, a court of appeals may presume that
a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. However, there is to
be no presumption of unreasonableness or even a mathematically
rigid proportionality principle that correlates numerically the
amount of the trial court's justification with the amount of devia-
tion from the Guidelines. At the same time, a court of appeals
160. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464 ('CThe Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sen-
tencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the help of
many others in the law enforcement community over a long period of time in an effort to
fulfill this statutory mandate. They also reflect the fact that different judges (and others)
can differ as to how to best reconcile the disparate ends of punishment.").
161. Id. at 2463.
162. Id. at 2464.
163. 128 S. Ct. 586.
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"may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due def-
erence to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on
a whole, justify the extent of the variance."'164 It will be interest-
ing to see how the courts of appeals apply Gall in the months and
years ahead.
V. CONCLUSION
Booker has clearly wrought a new era in sentencing. Federal
judges, once the receptacle of unfettered discretion, again retain
discretion to sentence individual offenders based on individual
determinations. However, that discretion must be properly exer-
cised, balancing it against Congress' and the Sentencing Commis-
sion's interests in uniformity and proportionality in sentences.
Therefore, federal judges should not use this newfound discretion
to blaze new sentencing trails, but rather should always begin
with the well-worn trails forged by the Sentencing Guidelines,
branching out only when those trails lead to unjust results. To
fail to do so could result in disparate sentences and, ultimately,
legislative backlash that would strip the federal judiciary of its
newly retrieved discretion. On the other hand, the result of prop-
erly guided discretion will be sentences that are apt for the crime
and the offender, that consider congressional judgments, and that
maintain the reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparities be-
tween defendants.
164. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
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